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Abstract 
This paper studies the development of institutional structures for prudential and business 
conduct supervision of financial services over the past decade for 98 high and middle income 
countries. It identifies possible drivers of changes in these supervisory structures using a 
panel ordered probit analysis. The results show that (i) countries advancing to a higher stage 
of economic development tend to integrate their financial sector supervisory structure. 
Similarly, improvements in overall public governance drive countries to adopting more 
integrated supervisory arrangements. (ii) Greater independence of the central bank could 
entail less integration of prudential supervision, but not necessarily of business conduct. (iii) 
Small open economies opt for more integrated structures of financial sector supervision, 
especially on the prudential side. (iv) Financial deepening makes countries integrate 
supervision progressively more, however, greater development of the non-bank financial 
system including capital markets and the insurance industry makes countries opt for less 
integrated prudential supervision but not business conduct supervision structures. (v) The 
lobbying power of concentrated and highly profitable banking sectors acts as a significant 
negative force against business conduct integration. (vi) Countries with banking sectors that 
have been more exposed to aggregate liquidity risk, due to their high share of external 
funding, tend to integrate more their prudential supervision. Finally, (vii) a country that has 
experienced past financial crises is more likely to integrate its supervisory structure for 
financial services. 
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Services, International Experience, Panel Data Analysis, Ordered Probit. 
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1. Introduction 
Why supervisory structures for the financial sector differ so much across United States, 
Germany, Japan and other developed countries concerning the degree of integration in 
microprudential supervision and its proximity to macroprudential supervision as well as the 
pursuit and modalities of business conduct supervision? What models have the emerging 
market economies and developing countries chosen to follow and why? And, is there a 
prevailing trend toward certain benchmark models that countries can follow going forward 
according to their financial system typology? Several potential drivers behind the choice of a 
supervisory structure for a particular country‟s financial system, such as the size, depth and 
complexity of the financial system, the size of financial subsectors and operation of financial 
groups in the country, financial sector lobbying power and other political economy factors, 
the overall quality and independence of public institutions, and experience of past financial 
crises, among others, come to mind. The importance of the drivers varies across developed 
countries, as do the tendencies of developing countries to follow the diverging examples of 
supervisory structures in more advanced, role model economies. However, recent 
observations suggest that the occurrence and uneven impact of the global financial crisis 
across countries and regions weakened the rigidity with which countries adhere to their 
existing supervisory structures, and open a window of opportunity for reforms. At the same 
time, the ongoing debates suggest a tendency towards the adoption of more unified and 
harmonized designs for the institutional structure of financial sector supervision, going 
forward.  
 
The literature discusses extensively the different models for prudential supervision, 
the pros and cons of a unified supervisor, and the role of central bank in the supervision and 
eventual unification (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2007; Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2007; 
Herring and Carmassi, 2008). Several studies attempt to establish a relationship between the 
performance of supervisors and their degree of unification across financial sectors (Arnone 
and Gambini, 2006; and Cihak and Podpiera, 2006). Other studies analyze the relevance of 
country characteristics for the type of the chosen supervision structure (Shen, 2006, 
Masciandaro, 2006, 2007 and 2009). To our knowledge, all existing empirical studies are 
based on cross-sectional data sets, and thus analyze the supervisory frameworks at a certain 
point in time. In addition, the reviews of supervisory regimes and related empirical studies 
focus primarily on microprudential supervision. These studies pay only marginal attention to 
the proximity of microprudential and macroprudential supervision, and to business conduct 
supervision and its complementary function to prudential supervision.  
 
This paper studies the historical development of prudential as well as business 
conduct supervisory structures for financial services over the past decade for 98 high and 
middle income countries, and identifies possible drivers of changes in the supervisory 
structures using an ordered probit panel analysis. It employs a new, unique dataset that 
enables to study changes and differences in supervisory structures over time as well as across 
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countries. The dimensions of the supervisory structures considered in this study include 
fragmentation versus integration of supervision across individual financial sub-sectors, 
placement of the integrated supervisor within a central bank or under a separate authority – 
and thus the proximity of microprudential and macroprudential supervision, and the 
separation between prudential supervision and business conduct supervision
1
 in the context 
of the overall supervisory structure for financial services. Based on the results of the analysis, 
the paper contemplates possible benchmark models according to the country typology. 
 
Possible determinants of supervisory structures considered in our study can be 
divided into four sets of indicators: (i) countries‟ general and economic development 
indicators; (ii) political and governance indicators, such as the quality of governance and the 
autonomy of the central bank; (iii) financial sector development indicators, such as the depth 
and complexity of the financial system, including banking sector characteristics such as 
concentration, efficiency, profitability, and liquidity, and (iv) the number of past financial 
crises experienced by a country. In addition to the baseline ordered probit, we employ the 
binomial probit and multinomial logit models, and the pooled regression analysis to ensure 
robustness of our baseline estimates. Building on the identified significant determinants of 
changes in supervisory structures over time and across countries, the paper draws preliminary 
conclusions about possible country benchmark models going forward. This forward-looking 
perspective is enabled by the time-series dimension of our panel dataset.  
 
We find that, as countries advance to a higher stage of economic development, they 
tend to integrate more their financial sector supervisory structures. Also improvements in 
overall public governance drive countries to adopting more integrated supervisory 
arrangements. Greater independence of the central bank, which is often involved in 
supervision of banks, could entail less integration of prudential supervision, but not 
necessarily business conduct. In this regard, our results provide some qualifications to those 
obtained by Masciandaro (2006, 2007 and 2009). Further, small open economies tend to opt 
for more integrated structures for financial sector supervision, especially on the prudential 
side, although a progressively higher degree of openness could coincide with less integration 
of business conduct supervision. The experience of past crises gears the country choices 
toward more integrated supervisory structures. Increased financial deepening makes 
countries integrate supervision progressively more. In contrast, strong development of the 
non-bank financial sectors including capital markets and the insurance industry makes 
countries opt for a less integrated prudential supervision structure but not the business 
conduct supervision structure. The lobbying power of the banking sector, associated with 
more concentrated banking systems, characterized by higher monopolistic pricing powers 
and chronic inefficiencies, appears to act as a significant negative force against business 
conduct. Finally, countries with banking sectors that have been more exposed to aggregate 
                                                 
1
 The business conduct supervision here includes financial consumer protection and market integrity 
supervision, and we will use this term as an integrating concept for these slightly distinct areas throughout the 
paper. 
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liquidity risk, due to their high share of external funding, tend to integrate more their 
prudential supervision.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new panel data 
set and discusses the developments in prudential and business conduct supervision in our 
sample of 98 countries over the past decade. Section 3 describes the estimation methodology. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and presents some 
policy implications.   
 
 
2. Panel Data 
Our statistics to illustrate the changes from sectoral (institutional) to integrated (functional) 
supervisory structures, with an emphasis on the role of the central banks in the supervision, 
are based on a dataset of 98 countries during the period 1999-2010. Institutional regulations 
envisage different rules and different supervisors for each type of intermediary (banks, 
insurance or capital market)
2
 while functional regulation model has common rules for similar 
financial activities regardless of which intermediary carries them out. We compile two 
datasets of financial sector supervisory structures, one for prudential supervision and the 
other for business conduct supervision, covering 98 countries over the 1999-2010 period. The 
review of supervisory regimes behind the constructed dataset is based on the 1999-2010 
editions of “How countries supervise their banking, insurers and securities markets” and on-
line official information from country authorities related to the supervisory institutions. 
Among the 98 countries, there are 40 high-income, 34 upper-middle income, and 24 lower-
middle income economies. For illustrative purposes, we divide these countries into two 
subgroups according to their financial depth.  
 
The two datasets on prudential and business conduct supervision consist of discrete 
variables, where the values of the variables represent a distinct type of a supervisory structure. 
The prudential supervision dataset distinguishes among the following structures:  
1. Sectoral (institutional) supervision with the banking supervision in an agency 
other than the central bank;  
2. Sectoral (institutional) supervision with the banking supervision in the central 
bank;  
3. Partial integration, where two financial sectors are supervised by the same 
institution, either the central bank or an agency outside of the central bank;  
4. Integration of the main financial subsectors‟ supervisions in a Financial 
Supervisory Authority (FSA)
3
;   
5. Integration of the main financial subsectors‟ supervisions into the central bank4.  
                                                 
2
 We thus abstract from other possibly relevant subsectors that could have separate supervisors such as pension 
funds, non-bank credit institutions or other non-bank financial institutions. 
3
 FSA also stands for Financial Supervision Authority, Financial Services Authority, or Financial Services 
Agency.  
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 Compilation of the business conduct supervision dataset required a more judgmental 
approach. Although many countries have in place the legislative framework concerning 
transparency of operations and consumer protection, some of them lack the enforcement 
mechanism, especially in regards to financial consumer protection. Pursuing transparency 
and disclosure is on the agenda of many prudential supervisors. The Codes of Banking 
Practices often set the standards for financial consumer protection. However, the 
investigation, resolution, and arbitration of customer complaints (in particular banking 
customers) are pursued only in some countries. We include in the group of countries which 
pursue business conduct supervision, all those that have in place, in addition to directives on 
the pursuit of transparency and consumer protection, also an enforcement mechanism for 
financial consumer regulation and dispute resolution. When considering these criteria, we 
account for (i) countries that have specialized agencies looking after all aspects of the 
business conduct across financial subsectors (i.e. the “twin peak” model, or prudential 
supervisors that are assigned also business conduct supervision), as well as for (ii) countries 
where there are no institutions with statutory responsibility for overall business conduct 
supervision of the banking sector, but they have set important steps towards an adequate 
consumer protection in all financial subsectors and established institutions, such as a 
Financial Consumer Protection (FCP) Agency, Financial Ombudsman, or special 
departments for consumer finance within the Consumer Protection Agency.   
                         
       Following the outlined approach, we classify the following business conduct 
supervisory structures:  
1. No business conduct supervision – not all financial sectors have assigned business 
conduct supervision. Typically, the prudential supervisors of the insurance sector 
and capital markets are mandated to oversee business conduct in the respective 
sectors. Hence, in our data set, in most cases, no business conduct is assigned due 
to the lack of business conduct supervision for the banking sector.
5
  
2. Separate institution(s) for financial consumer protection – this category comprises 
those countries in which there is no agency with statutory responsibility for 
business conduct supervision of the banking sector. However there exist 
institutions or specialized departments in the national consumer protection agency 
that oversee the protection of the financial consumers, including banking product 
consumers.  Typically, these agencies look after the FCP in one or two financial 
subsectors. More specifically, this category includes those countries in which the 
prudential supervisors do not have statutory responsibility for FCP but there exist 
either a FCP Agency (e.g., Canada or Mexico), or specialized complaint boards 
within an economy-wide consumer agency (e.g., Denmark), or a Financial 
Ombudsman Bureau 
 
(e.g. Greece). 
                                                                                                                                                       
4
 The main financial subsectors that we consider are: the banking sector, the insurance sector and the capital 
markets sector.  
5
 In this way, we stress the importance of business conduct in the banking sector, given the predominance of the 
banking sectors in the financial sectors of most countries.  
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3. Sectoral supervision – where each financial sector‟s prudential supervisor is 
assigned with the business conduct supervision in addition to the prudential 
supervision;  
4. The business conduct supervision is assigned either to the central bank or to the 
FSA, which act as an integrated supervisor;  
5. The “twin peak” model – where there exists an institution exclusively supervising 
business conduct in provision of all financial services.  
 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detail summary of the regimes for prudential 
and business conduct supervisions as of end-2010 for each country in our sample. In addition, 
Figure A1 and Table A2 in Appendix illustrate the changes in prudential supervision 
structures during 1999-2010 and, Figure A2 and Table A3 in Appendix show the trends in 
business conduct supervision.  
 
The first column of plots in Figure A1 depict the proportion of countries that had 
particular supervisory structures, i.e., institutional type of supervisory structures and 
functional type of supervision (partial integration, FSA integration and Central Bank 
integration) for each year during the 1999-2010, for all countries as well as separately for 
high financial depth and low financial depth economies. The second column of plots in 
Figure A1 add information about the changes in central banks‟ role in supervision, i.e., the 
proportion of countries with partial integration within and outside of the central bank, as well 
as the proportion of countries with an institutional prudential supervision, where banking 
supervision is within the central bank or in an agency outside the central bank, respectively.   
 
During the past decade, there has been a certain tendency to unify the prudential 
supervision. The overall proportion of countries that preserved the traditional (conservative) 
model of institutional regulation decreased from 62 percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2010 
while the overall proportion of countries that adopted a FSA or integrated the supervision 
under the central bank increased substantially: from 11 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2010 
for FSA, and from three percent in 1999 to 8 percent in 2010 for central bank integration. 
The proportion of countries that chose to integrate in a FSA outpaced those that integrated in 
the central bank, both in high and low financial depth economies. 
 
The prevalence of central banks in the prudential banking supervision has diminished. 
Among economies with high financial depth, the central banks were responsible for banking 
supervision in 58 percent of countries in 2010, down from 66 percent in 1999, and in 
economies with a lower financial depth, it has decreased from 70 percent to 67 percent. 
However, the proportion of countries with partial integration in the central bank did not 
change significantly. At the same time, the proportion of countries with partial integration 
outside of the central bank decreased because some of them chose to unify all sectors‟ 
supervision in a FSA. 
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Tables A2 in Appendix, constructed as a transition matrix, provide more detailed 
information about the changes in the supervisory structures during 1999-2010. It reports the 
number of countries with specific prudential supervisory regimes at the beginning and at the 
end of the time span as well as the number of countries that changed from a specific regime 
to another regime. Column (1) reports the number of countries having a certain supervisory 
regime as of 1999 (e.g., in 1999, 48 economies had sectoral prudential supervision, with the 
banking supervision within the central bank, seven economies had sectoral prudential 
supervision, with the banking supervision in an agency outside the central bank, etc). The top 
of the columns (2) - (7) report the number of countries with particular supervisory regime as 
of 2010 (e.g., among all countries in the data set, in 2010, 36 had sectoral prudential 
supervision). Cells of the tables state the number of countries that transited from a specific 
supervisory regime to another (e.g., out of the 48 countries that in 1999 had a sectoral 
prudential supervision with the banking supervision within the central bank, 32 countries 
maintained this regime, one country adopted a sectoral regime, in which the banking 
supervision is outside of the central bank, three countries adopted a partial integration in the 
central bank, four countries adopted a partial integration outside the central bank – one of 
these countries changed further to another regime – three countries changed to an FSA, and 
five countries chose to integrated the prudential supervision in the central bank).  
 
The decrease in the number of economies with institutional supervision and 
integrations in a FSA had the most occurrences among the changes in prudential supervision. 
The number of countries with a FSA as integrated supervisor increased from 10 in 1999 to 24 
in 2010. These changes took place in equal number among economies with high and low 
financial depth. Overall, half of the economies that adopted a FSA during this period had 
initially a partial integration of prudential supervision outside of the central bank. The 
number of countries that chose to integrate the prudential supervision in the central bank 
increased from three in 1999 to eight in 2010. Four of these changes took place in economies 
with lower financial depth. Typically, central bank integration occurred in economies that 
had initially a sectoral supervision regime with the central bank overlooking the banking 
sector. The number of partial integrations outside of central banks decreased overall – as 
seven countries with this type of supervision chose to integrate in a FSA –, while the number 
of partial integrations within the central bank slightly increased due to three changes from 
sectoral supervision regime.  
 
In terms of patterns observed in integrating into FSA or central bank, economies that 
had initially sectoral supervision with the banking supervision outside of the central bank and 
those with partial integration outside of the central bank typically tend to either maintain their 
supervisory regime or integrate in a FSA. Also, among economies that have a sectoral 
supervision with the central bank supervising the banking sector, there is a higher probability 
to integrate into the central bank than into a FSA. Another pattern emerging from the 
transition matrix of integration, illustrated in Table A2, is that among the high-financial-
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depth countries, the majority of changes towards integration occurred from an initial state of 
partial integration, while among countries with lower financial depth, the full integration took 
place mainly from the initial sectoral supervision.  
 
Figure A2 in Appendix shows the proportion of countries that have: (i) some agency 
responsible for business conduct supervision in all financial subsector, (ii) an integrated 
agency to supervise the business conduct, and (iii) a “twin peak” supervisory structure. A 
breakdown by lower and higher financial depth is also provided. Table 3 illustrates the 
process of adopting supervision of the business conduct between 1999-2010, by providing 
information about the number of countries within each classification of business conduct 
supervision in 1999 and 2010 respectively,  and the transitions among these classifications.  
 
The raise in awareness of the importance of adequate business conduct in financial 
sectors is reflected in the increased proportion of countries that look after its enforcement; 
from 20 percent of the total pool of countries in 1999 to 50 percent in 2010. The percentage 
of countries supervising business conduct is higher among economies with high financial 
depth (63 percent versus 41 percent), however also the economies with lower financial depth 
have been adopting some form of business conduct supervision increasingly.  
 
Table A3 in the Appendix shows that in 15 out of the 33 countries that adopted or 
integrated the business conduct supervision during 1999-2010, the change was introduced by 
an integration either in a FSA or central bank, or adoption of a “twin peak” model. The rest 
of countries introduced business conduct as part of prudential supervision or founded outside 
agencies to foster financial consumer protection. The twin peak type of supervision structures 
are still very limited, countries that adopted this model typically show the high financial 
depth economies.   
 
 
3. Estimation Methodology 
We are interested in estimating the main determinants of institutional structures for financial 
prudential supervision and business conduct supervision using a panel data covering 98 
countries during 1999-2010.  The aim is to explain the choice of a particular supervisory 
structure using a country‟s general, economic, political, and financial sector indicators, and 
find which of the indicators could be the most important. We use an ordered choice model 
for this purpose. The general ordered choice model, a latent variable regression, takes the 
following form: 
   '* xy        (1) 
where *y  is the unobserved variable, x is a vector of explanatory variables,   is the random 
disturbance normally distributed across observations, with mean and variance normalized to 
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one and zero, respectively
6
, and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. What is 
observed is the dependent variable y that takes the values: 0y  if *y ;0 : 1y  if  
0
*y ;
1
  2y   if  2
*
1   y ; … Jy    if  
*
1 yJ   (Green, 2003). The estimation 
method is maximum likelihood.  
 
The choice of a particular supervisory structure thus represents the dependent variable 
in the model. The supervisory structures are ordered based on the degree of integration. In 
addition, for prudential supervision, we focus also on the proximity to the central bank (the 
macroprudential supervisor).
 7
 The partial integration regimes, in which two financial sectors 
are supervised by a single agency, were classified as sectoral supervision. This was mainly 
for the reason that the data could not identify a strong cutoff point between these two regimes 
in the initial regression analysis. The observed prudential supervisory structures are thus 
classified into the following categories:   
1. Sectoral supervision, with the banking sector supervised by an agency outside of 
the central bank;  
2. Sectoral supervision, with the central bank overseeing the banking sector;  
3. Unified supervision in a FSA; and  
4. Unified supervision in the central bank.  
 
For the business conduct supervision, the ordering respects the degree of integration and the 
dominating mandate of business conduct supervision in the integrated institution: 
1. No business conduct;  
2. An agency for financial consumer protection exists but there is not an integrated 
business conduct supervisor and prudential supervisors have no responsibility for 
business conduct;  
3. Sectoral business conduct;  
4. FSA or central bank as integrated supervisors are also assigned the task of 
business conduct supervision;  
5. “Twin peak” model, i.e., there is a unified authority with a single mandate for 
business conduct supervision.  
 
We thus order the twin peak structure as the highest given the single mandate assigned to the 
integrated business conduct supervisor within this structure. 
  
There are four groups of explanatory variables: country general and economic 
development indicators, political economy indicators, financial sector development indicators, 
and financial crises experience. The general country characteristics include the population 
count, GDP per capita, and the degree of openness (total trade as a percentage of GDP).
 
To 
characterize a country‟s political environment that is relevant to our investigation, we focus 
                                                 
6
 The normal and logistic distributions generally give similar results in practice (Green, 2003). 
7
 In the case of classical sectoral models, we distinguished among the banking supervision in the central bank 
and banking supervision in a different agency than the central bank. 
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on the quality of governance and the independence of the central bank. The quality of 
governance is based on the average of the six governance indicators
8
 constructed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010).  For the central bank independence indicator, we use the central 
bank autonomy (CBA) index estimated in Arnone et al. (2007), which assesses the CBA at 
the end of 2003.  
 
The financial sector development indicators that we consider comprise private credit 
as a percentage of GDP, stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, the number of 
listed companies, and the non-life insurance premium as a percentage of GDP. Further, to 
characterize specifically a country‟s banking sector, we focus on banking concentration, 
efficiency, profitability, liquidity, and performance. The banking concentration is measured 
by the share of the three largest banks in total banking sector assets. The efficiency is 
approximated by the cost-to-income ratio. Countries‟ average net interest margin and the 
proportion of the non interest income in total income describe banking sector profitability. 
The liquidity indicator is measured by the ratio of liquid assets over deposits and short-term 
funding, and the ratio of private credit over deposits. Additional financial soundness 
indicators for banks that we consider include the non-performing loans ratio (NPL), capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR), and capital to assets ratio. 
 
Finally, we consider the effect of past financial crises on the choice to integrate. 
Carmichael et al. (2004) note that in some Nordic or Asian countries the creation of 
integrated supervisors was prompted by a recent financial sector crisis. On the other hand, 
Cihak and Podpiera (2006), based on the visual inspection of a cross-section of countries as 
of 2004, claim that this relationship is far from straightforward. We aim to capture the effect 
of past financial crises by their cumulative count as of 1996.
9
 The cumulative number of 
financial crises was constructed based on Laeven and Valencia‟s (2008) financial crisis 
episodes database, covering the period 1970-2007. The database was updated using the same 
criteria for the period 2008-2010.  Table A4 in the Appendix lists data sources for all 
explanatory variables employed in our regression analysis. 
 
Formally, the estimated panel regression is specified as: 
 
                                                 
8
 The six governance indicators are the following: voice and accountability, political stability no violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
9
 We consider also other statistics related to financial crisis experience, namely, zero-one variable indicating 
simply whether a country has experienced a crisis or not, a measure of whether country experienced a single or 
repeated crises in last 15 years, and the time from the last crisis (in years). Only the cumulative number of crises 
was kept in the baseline regression for its best performance and behavior in the regression.  
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             (2) 
All variables in equation (2) are lagged by one period in order to avoid possible endogeneity 
problems, except for the “central bank autonomy” (which is a constant for each country).  
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present regression results for specifications, in which the dependent variables 
are ordered prudential supervision structures and business conduct supervision structures, 
respectively. The tables present estimation results for each selected subgroup of explanatory 
variables (columns 1-10), as well as for all explanatory variables (column 11). Column (12) 
presents results of the parsimonious regressions based on adjusted R-squared maximization. 
Results for the full specification, presented in column (11), do not account for the effect of 
bank soundness indicators (NPL, CAR, and the capital to assets ratio), because data for these 
variables are available only as of 2003. The results are therefore only presented for the 
subgroup of the financial soundness indicators. As a robustness check for the main regression 
results, Table 3 reports additional estimation results using alternative model specification and 
estimation approaches. Namely, the robustness is tested by fitting to the data the pooled 
ordered probit model, binary choice panel data model, and multinomial panel data model.    
 
   
4.1.  Prudential Supervision 
Table 1 shows the country characteristics that influence the likelihood of integration in 
prudential supervision: the country size, openness, the level of development, the overall 
quality of governance, the extent of central bank‟s autonomy, financial sector development 
indicators, and the number of past financial crises. Based on the estimates, there is a higher 
probability of integrating prudential supervision in small economies. The population size has 
a negative and significant coefficient both when considered in a subgroup regression as well 
as in the full specification. Typically, a small economy has a small financial sector; hence an 
integration of the supervisory institutions assigned to the financial subsectors could be more 
feasible and practical than in the case of an economy with a large financial sector with 
prominent subsectors. Furthermore, in small economies with relatively small financial sectors, 
the integration is likely to enhance cost efficiency, especially through supervisory staff 
reduction, and economizing on the fixed investments (IT infrastructure and systems, training 
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facilities, etc) that can be consolidated in the case of unified prudential supervision 
(Erbenova, 2006).  
 
      [Table 1 about here] 
 
The degree of a country‟s openness and its level of development (GDP per capita) 
positively influence the likelihood of prudential supervision‟s integration. More developed 
countries could easier mobilize resources necessary for developing and implementing the 
strategy for transition from less to more integrated supervisory structure. Also, banking 
systems of more developed countries are relatively more sophisticated and characterized by 
the presence of financial conglomerates. Thus, the integration of prudential supervision of 
main financial subsectors could increase the effectiveness of prudential supervision. Further, 
a country‟s openness is positively related to the probability of integrating prudential 
supervision, as increased capital flows in and out of the country need a holistic monitoring 
and managing of exposures to capital flow reversals.  
 
Regarding political economy variables, both governance and central bank autonomy 
play an important role. The quality of governance stays significant in all specifications, 
underlying the importance of good governance for the decision to integrate (as found also in 
Masciandaro, 2006 and 2007). The significant and negative coefficient estimate for central 
bank‟s autonomy suggests that integration of prudential supervision is a less preferred 
outcome from the point of view of an independent central bank. This could be because the 
integration of prudential supervision in the central bank brings about additional 
responsibilities for the central bank.
10
 One may also argue that the integration process itself 
could jeopardize the previously established independence of the central bank‟s monetary 
policy. 
 
Although the evidence from the subgroup regressions shows that several financial 
development indicators are significant, in the full specification, only the coefficient of stock 
market capitalization comes out significant. In the subgroup regressions, the credit to GDP 
ratio impacts positively the probability of integration, while the variables representing the 
other financial sectors (non-life premium, and stock market capitalization) have negative 
impacts. A large banking sector is more likely to be interconnected with other financial 
subsectors. Hence there is a synergy effect that a unified supervision can induce (see De 
Luna Martinez and Rose, 2003; Cihak and Podpiera, 2006; Herring and Carmassi, 2008). 
However, if the non-banking financial subsectors are relatively large, a sectoral supervision 
might be more appropriate as the drawbacks coming from an oversized institution conducting 
prudential supervision might be higher than the synergetic benefits of integration (see also 
                                                 
10
 Highly autonomous central banks might have preferred to keep their strong independence that primarily came 
from the mandate of monetary policy implementation. Nevertheless, recent events have shown that integration 
of prudential outside the central bank (in a FSA) could prohibit the synergies between the conduct of monetary 
policy and banking supervision. 
 13 
Cihak and Podpiera, 2006; Herring and Carmassi, 2006). In the full specification, only the 
coefficient on the stock market capitalization turns out significant, revealing a negative 
impact of the size of securities market on the probability of integration.
11
  
 
Among the banking sector characteristics, the aggregate liquidity risk exposure 
(private credit to deposit ratio) appears the most important indicator influencing the 
likelihood of a change toward integrated prudential supervision as it remains significant in 
the full specification. The estimated positive effect suggests that an increased exposure to 
aggregate liquidity risk has prompted changes towards unified prudential supervision in the 
past. The results from subgroup regressions reveal also a negative significant coefficient on 
the net interest margin, a proxy for banking sector profitability that could be related to the 
influence of the banking sector lobby on prudential integration. Namely, the higher the 
banking sector profitability, the higher is its preference for status quo in prudential 
supervision, and hence the lower is the probability of integrating prudential supervision.  
 
The cumulative number of financial crises, which a country has experienced, has 
clearly brought about an increase in the incentives to integrate prudential supervision. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that an integrated supervisor, which provides for the close 
proximity of micro- and macro-prudential supervision, is better prepared to prevent or cope 
with episodes of system-wide financial distress than sectoral supervisors.  
 
4.2. Business Conduct Supervision 
The estimation results in Table 2 reveal which of the considered variables could significantly 
affect the probability that a country established and integrated business conduct supervision: 
the income level, degree of openness, financial depth, banking sector concentration, 
aggregate liquidity exposure (the share of foreign financing), and the number of past 
financial crises. The income level is a robust explanatory variable, maintaining sign and 
significance in all regressions. The results thus suggest that as countries develop, more 
integration of business conduct supervision is desired to presumably ensure holistic and 
consistent oversight of business conduct in the provision of financial services. The degree of 
openness is significant in the regression but with a negative sign, suggesting a higher 
probability of existence and greater integration of business conduct supervision in relatively 
less open economies. Open economies are subject to high capital inflows and prudential 
supervisors in conjunction with monetary policy have to be extra vigilant in preventing and 
managing the volumes and allocation of capital inflows. In the past, this may have directed 
the open economies‟ focus to further optimizing of their prudential supervision structure at 
the expense of the business conduct supervision.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
11
 The loss of significance of the other financial depth variables  is probably due to the presence of colinearity as 
the credit to GDP ratio and the GDP per capita are positively correlated (see the correlation matrix in Appendix).  
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As for the political characteristics, the quality of a country‟s governance is an 
important factor for business conduct integration in the subset regression, but it loses its 
significance in the full regression, likely due to the significant correlation between the 
governance and income. The Central Bank Autonomy Index is not significant both in the 
subset regression and in the parsimonious regression. However when disentangling central 
bank‟s political 12  and economic autonomy13  (column (4)), it appears that the economic 
independence is inversely related to the degree of integration in business conduct supervision 
while higher political autonomy is positively associated with it. These two countering effects 
then cancel out in the aggregated index.  
 
Concerning the financial development indicators, financial deepening (private credit 
to GDP) is the only variable staying significant and positive in all regressions. The greater 
the financial inclusion of household and firms in credit provision, the higher is the 
probability that the country will establish and integrate its business conduct supervision. We 
can conjecture that a greater development of the banking sector (higher credit to GDP) 
increases inter-linkages with other financial subsectors, and leads to emergence of financial 
conglomerates. This could then prompt the decision to integrate business conduct supervision 
to a greater degree to eliminate possible loopholes in fragmented sectoral supervision. 
 
Banking sector characteristics, such as net interest margins and concentration have 
persistently significant negative effects on integration of business conduct supervision. The 
negative effect of net interest margins could stem from the negative influence of greater 
market monopolistic power, which allows for sustained high profit margins, on the business 
conduct supervision. Similarly, highly concentrated banking sectors typically show greater 
lobbying power that could be put to work against the introduction of and a more holistic 
approach to business conduct supervision. In addition, several other characteristics of the 
banking sector appear significant in the subset regression but lose their significance in the 
full regression, likely due to present colinearities. Moreover, the number of financial crises 
experienced in the recent past positively influenced the choice to implement and integrate 
business conduct supervision. 
 
4.3. Robustness analysis 
We employ different model structures and estimation methods to test the robustness of our 
baseline estimation results. Namely, we use the ordered probit pooled regression estimation 
                                                 
12
 Political autonomy is defined as the ability of a central bank to select the final objectives of monetary policy. 
The defining criteria refer to the way the central bank governor and board of directors are appointed, to the 
government involvement in the monetary policy formulation and whether the monetary policy is one of the 
primary objectives.  
13
 Economic autonomy corresponds with the central bank‟s operational autonomy, especially in regards to 
government lending. In addition, another criterion defining this autonomy is that the central bank has no 
responsibility for overseeing the banking sector or shares responsibilities.  
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method, the binary choice model, and the multinomial model to test the impact of the chosen 
functional form, and the classification and ordering of the dependent variables. Table 3 
reports the results of these robustness tests. 
 
Overall, the pooled regressions results support the main panel results. Specifically, 
the effects of income, openness, population, good governance, central bank autonomy, the 
number of past crises, and banking concentration, liquidity, and profitability from the 
baseline estimations hold. The only puzzling estimation result relates to the effect of financial 
depth. The coefficient of the credit to GDP ratio turns out significant and negative for 
prudential supervision estimation. Nevertheless, for the same regressions, the coefficient of 
stock market capitalization and non-life insurance as percentage of GDP are negative and 
significant, as in the ordered probit regressions. Hence, the interpretation that greater 
development of financial subsectors other than the banking one, encourages countries to opt 
for more sectoral rather than integrated supervision, still holds.  
 
The binary choice regressions test the effect of the explanatory variables on less 
granular classification of the supervisory structures that distinguishes only among unified and 
non-unified supervision. For prudential supervision, the unified structure includes FSA and 
unified supervision in the central bank. For business conduct supervision, the unified 
structure includes those FSA or central banks with statutory responsibilities for business 
conduct supervision and the twin peak supervisory model. Regarding the prudential 
supervision regression, the effects of income, stock market capitalization, and banking 
liquidity hold, and appear crucial for the decision to integrate prudential supervision. It seems 
that the other significant explanatory variables in the ordered regressions (population, trade, 
good governance, central bank autonomy, number of cumulative crises) could be more 
important for describing the type of supervisory structures. In addition, the binary choice 
regression for the prudential supervision reveals other significant explanatory variables 
behind the decision to integrate prudential supervision. These are the concentration, the 
proxy for efficiency (cost to income ratio), and the ratio of non-interest income to total 
income of the banking sector. All of these variables, which can be related to the lobbing 
power of the banking sector, are significant and negative. The banking sector lobbying power 
appears to act as a negative force against the integration of prudential supervision. This is 
presumably to preserve capital and other profit-driven arbitrage opportunities across financial 
subsectors and within financial groups. The results of the business conduct binary choice 
regression support the estimated effects of income, the number of past crises, the stock 
market capitalization, and concentration from the ordered probit regression. Further, the 
binary choice regression indicates that the remaining significant variables from the ordered 
regression (trade and net interest margin) have more relevance for explaining the particular 
type of business conduct supervision rather than its overall integration.  
 
We also employ the multinomial logit model to test the effect of explanatory 
variables on the ratio of the probability of choosing one supervisory category over the 
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probability of choosing a reference supervisory category (this is the first category in our 
ranking
14
). For the dependent variable characterizing prudential supervision structures, all 
three sets of results – corresponding to the three ratios of probabilities15 – are generally 
supportive of the baseline results. An increase in the income level, the credit to GDP ratio 
and the private credit to deposit ratio seem to characterize environments in which countries 
opt for relatively more integrated supervisory structures. The population, CBA index, and the 
ratio of non-life insurance premium over GDP affect negatively this preference. For other 
variables, the coefficients turn out significant only when explaining some of the probability 
ratios. The openness impacts positively only the preference towards unified structures (FSA 
or central bank unification). In the same manner, the positive effect of the number of past 
crises and the negative effect of the stock market capitalization appear to influence only the 
preference toward the central bank unification.  
 
Albeit backing the baseline results in general, the results of the multinomial 
regressions for business conduct supervision are less uniform across the three reported 
probability ratios, compared to those for prudential supervision.
16
 At the same time, they are 
conveying interesting information as to which probability ratio is influenced by the changes 
in explanatory variables, given that the reference supervisory structure is “no business 
conduct supervision”. The effects of the income level, CBA index, and credit over GDP ratio 
hold for all three probability ratios. Openness negatively influences only probability ratios 
pertaining to the change from no business conduct to sectoral business conduct and partial 
business conduct with certain degree of consumer finance protection, but not the change to 
the unified business conduct supervision. The cumulative number of past crises positively 
impacts only the probability ratios related to the partial and to the unified business conduct 
supervision. The banking concentration, on the other hand, affects negatively the latter two 
probability ratios. The profitability indicators affect negatively the probability ratio of a 
change to the partial business conduct supervision structure with an enforcement of financial 
consumer protection.  
 
5. Actual and Model Predicted Supervisory Structures 
In this section, we benchmark the existing supervisory structures of the individual countries 
in our sample against the model predicted degree of integration concerning prudential and 
business conduct. This is to illustrate whether a country‟s supervisory structure followed the 
prevailing global trends based on its typology, and to identify out- and under-performers in 
                                                 
14
 For prudential supervision the first category is “sectoral supervision, with the banking sector supervised by an 
agency outside of the central bank”. For the business conduct the first category is “no business conduct”.  
15
 1. Probability of choosing category 2 / Probability of choosing category 1; 2. Probability of choosing category 
3 / Probability of choosing category 1; 3. Probability of choosing category 4 / Probability of choosing category 
1.      
16
 There are three sets of results (corresponding to three probability ratio) because we had to merge the last two 
ranked supervisory structures: (i) unified in FSA or central bank and (ii) the “twin peaks model” to be able to 
run the regressions successfully in terms of clear identification from data and satisfactory diagnostics.  
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this respect. Although each country and its financial system is unique, the combination of 
indicators used in our study should be able, to a reasonable extent, to capture the country 
specifics for the purpose of this benchmarking exercise.        
5.1. Prudential Supervision 
Using the parsimonious estimates of the ordered probit model reported in Table 1 
(Column 12), we derive the model‟s predicted degree of integration for prudential 
supervisory structure for each country and compare it with the actual degree of integration 
(ranked 1-4, see Section 4), constructed as the average over 2008-2010. The result of such a 
comparison is depicted in Figure 1 along with the regression line showing under-performers 
in the north-west corner and over-performers in the south-east corner.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 shows that a number of countries under-perform in terms of integration of 
their prudential supervision predicted by our model which is based on historical cross-
country experience. In particular, the notable under-performers are Luxemburg, Panama, 
Costa Rica, Canada, and Chile, countries that are expected to have implemented prudential 
supervisory structures characterized by greater integration given the experience of their peers. 
On the other hand, there are several over-performers including Armenia, Czech Republic, 
Uruguay, Netherlands, Slovakia and Poland that integrated their prudential supervisory 
structures more than predicted by their country and financial system characteristics.
17
  
 
 
5.2. Business Conduct Supervision 
Again, using the estimates of our model reported in Table 2 we compare the model‟s 
predicted values with the actual values (average over 2008-2010). The result of this 
comparison is shown in Figure 3 along with the regression line showing under-performers in 
the north-west corner and over-performers in the south-east corner.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 implies that the most notable underperformers in terms of implementation 
and integration of business conduct supervision, including mechanisms for its enforcement, 
could be the USA, Austria, Cyprus, and New Zealand. In contrast, there are no notable over-
performers pointing to the fact that implementation of holistic business conduct supervision 
and consumer finance protection is relatively new area in focus of the policymakers. 
                                                 
17
 For some of the countries in the over-performing category, a “fashion effect” maybe at work. The literature 
(see Masciandaro, 2008) refers to the fashion effect (or bandwagon effect) if reformers were inspired by the type 
of changes in governance arrangements introduced by earlier reformers rather than the effectiveness of an 
integrated supervisory structure based on their economic system and financial sector characteristics.  
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Nevertheless, some slight outperformers are pointed out by our model, and these include 
Singapore, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Uruguay, Kazakhstan, and Malta. The latter 
countries shown greater tendency to address business conduct supervision and consumer 
finance protection in more holistic way then their experience, and country and financial 
sector characteristics would suggest.      
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies a new dataset on the prudential and business conduct supervisory 
structures and their evolution over 1999-2010 for a panel of 98 countries. We show that the 
number of integrations of prudential supervision in a FSA outpaced those in a central bank: 
there were 14 new unifications of prudential supervision in a FSA and five unifications in a 
central bank since 1999. As for unification patterns, we found that countries that have 
originally sectoral supervision with the banking supervision outside of the central bank, and 
countries originally with partial integration outside of the central bank, typically tend to 
either maintain their prudential supervisory structure or integrate it in a FSA. Countries in 
which the central supervises the banking sector show a higher probability to integrate under 
the central bank than under a FSA.  
 
As regards the business conduct supervision, we observed an important increase in 
the proportion of countries that introduced its enforcement over 1999-2010. Almost fifty 
percent of the countries that did not have business conduct supervision in 1999, have adopted 
it during the past decade. In half of the cases, the change was accomplished by integration 
either in a FSA or central bank, or by adoption of the “twin peak” model. The rest of 
countries introduced business conduct supervision within the mandate of sectoral supervisors 
or founded a separate agency to foster financial consumer protection.  
 
We analyzed our panel dataset on supervisory structures using ordered probit 
regressions to identify possible drivers behind the integration of prudential and business 
conduct supervisory structures. We found that a country‟s level of development positively 
influences the probability of integrating both prudential and business conduct supervision. 
The size of a country and its degree of openness are important for the integration of 
supervision, albeit in a different manner. Regarding the prudential supervision integration, 
small open economies are more likely to integrate their prudential supervisory structures. 
Integration of business conduct supervision does not seem to be influenced by the size of a 
country, and trade openness shows a negative impact on such integration. Good governance 
and central bank‟s autonomy are important drives of prudential supervision integration. For 
business conduct supervision, these variables loose significance once the level of 
development is controlled for.  
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Financial deepening is an important determinant for integrating financial services 
supervision. The size of the banking sector influences positively the integration of both 
prudential and business conduct structures. However, development of financial subsectors, 
other than the banking one, affects negatively the tendency to integrate prudential 
supervision. In other words, the larger and more developed the non-banking financial sectors, 
the less beneficial or more difficult it is to introduce supervisory integration. Concerning 
banking sector characteristics, past high aggregate liquidity exposures seem to increase the 
likelihood that a county will implement integrated prudential supervision. For business 
conduct supervision, the lobbying power of the banking sector, approximated by banking 
sector concentration and profitability, negatively affects the probability of greater integration 
it. Finally, the number of past financial crises strongly increases the probability that a county 
will opt for integration of both prudential and business conduct supervisory structures. There 
seems to be a perception that supervisors are more equipped to effectively deal with episodes 
of systemic financial distress under integrated supervisory structures.  
 
Using the model predicted degree of supervisory integration against the actual 
supervisory structure in individual countries we identified under-performers in prudential 
supervision integration, as Luxemburg, Panama, Costa Rica, Canada, and Chile, and the 
over-performers to include Armenia, Czech Republic, Uruguay, Netherlands, Slovakia and 
Poland. The identified under-performers in business conduct supervision introduction and 
integration are the USA, Austria, Cyprus, and New Zealand, and the outperformers include 
Singapore, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Uruguay, Kazakhstan, and Malta. 
 
 
 
 20 
References 
Arnone, M., B. Laurens, J.F. Segalato, and M. Somer (2007). Central Bank Autonomy: 
Lessons from Global Trends. IMF WP/07/88 
 
Arnone M. and A. Gambini (2006). Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking 
Supervision. In Masciandaro, D., Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision 
Institutions: Independence,  Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
   
Cihak, M. and R. Podpiera (2006). Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International 
Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision. IMF WP/06/57. 
 
Green, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. 5
th
 edition. Prentice Hall, New Jersey 
 
Herring R. and J. Carmassi (2008). The Structure of Cross-Sector Financial Supervision. 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 17, 51-76. 
 
Erbenova, M. (2006). Integrating financial supervision in the Czech Republic. Law in 
Transition online, November 2006, Europena Bank for Development and Reconstruction.  
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010).  The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research, 2010 
 
Laeven, L. and F. Valencia (2008). Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database. IMF 
WP/08/224. 
 
Masciandaro, D. (2006). E pluribus unum? Authorities design in financial supervision: 
Trends and determinants. Open Economies Review 17, 73-102. 
 
Masciandaro, D. (2007). Divide et impera: financial supervision unification and the central 
bank fragmentation effect. European Journal of Political Economy 23, 285-315. 
 
Masciandaro, D. and  M. Quintyn (Eds) (2007). Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: 
Independence, Accountability and Governance. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
 
Masciandaro, D. (2009). Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the 
Central Bank: Why do they do it? Journal of Financial Stability 5, 124-146. 
 
Masciandaro, D., M. Quintyn, and M. Taylor (2008). Inside and outside the central bank: 
Independence and accountability in financial supervision. Trends and determinants. 
European Journal of Political Economy 24, 833-848.  
 
Masciandaro, D. and M. Quintyn (2008).  Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervision 
Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View. North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance.   
 
 21 
Masciandaro, D. and M. Quintyn (2011). Regulating the Regulators: The Changing Face of 
Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Crisis. European Company Law 
(October 2009), 6 (5), 187-196   
 
Shen, C.H. (2006). Determinants of the Financial Supervision System: Global Evidence, 
Banks and Bank Systems Volume 1, Issue 2. 
 
 
 22 
Main text tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Determinants of prudential supervision 
Explanatory vbs: Dependent variable: Prudential Supervision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
L1. GDP per 
capita at constant 
2000 prices 
0.014*** 
(0.0038) 
 
0.0595*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0545*** 
(0.00927) 
L1. Population  -0.0036*** 
(0.00031) 
 -0.0021*** 
(0.00036) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.000288) 
L1. Trade to GDP 
ratio 
 0.00643*** 
(0.00115) 
 0.0104*** 
(0.00153) 
0.00965*** 
(0.00136) 
L1. Governance 
 
 0.0399*** 
(0.00268) 
 0.0150** 
(0.00587) 
0.0096* 
(0.0054) 
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy index 
-0.831** 
(0.381) 
-3.861*** 
(0.425) 
-3.978*** 
(0.418) 
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy 
index_political 
 
0.133 
(0.145) 
1.653*** 
(0.152) 
 
0.673*** 
(0.144) 
0.652*** 
(0.134) 
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy 
index_economic 
0.271 
(0.297) 
L1. Crisis 
cumulative 
   
L1. Credit to GDP 
ratio 
 0.00368** 
(0.00145) 
 -0.0017 
(0.0023) 
 
L1. Non life 
premium 
 -0.280*** 
(0.0889) 
 -0.188 
(0.119)  
L1. Stock market  
capitalization 
 -0.005*** 
(0.0012) 
 -0.0088*** 
(0.00133) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0012) 
L1. Number of 
listed companies 
 -0.0071 
(0.0052) 
 0.00409 
(0.00683) 
 
L1. Concentration 
 
 0.00202 
(0.00232) 
 0.00126 
(0.00400)  
L1. Cost to 
income ratio 
 0.000345 
(0.00263) 
 -0.00301 
(0.00395)  
L1. Net interest 
margin 
 -0.0320* 
(0.0176) 
 0.0424 
(0.0363) 
 
L1. Non interest 
income 
 -0.00343 
(0.00314) 
 -0.00335 
(0.00489)  
L1. Private credit 
to deposit ratio 
 0.00239* 
(0.0014) 
 0.0102*** 
(0.00217) 
0.00981*** 
(0.00195) 
L1. Liquid assets 
to funding ratio 
 0.00144 
(0.00243) 
 -0.00336 
(0.00364)  
L1. Non perf. 
loans ratio 
 -0.0065 
(0.0137)   
L1. CAR   0.0129 
(0.0219)   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; L1 stands for variable’s first lag.     
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Table 2. Determinants of the business conduct supervision 
Explanatory vbs: Dependent variable: Business Conduct Supervision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
L1. GDP per capita at 
constant 2000 prices                          
0.0942*** 
(0.0061) 
         0.056*** 
(0.009) 
0.074*** 
(0.009)          
L1. Population  -0.0005 
(0.0003) 
        0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
3.07e-07 
(0.00057)          
L1. Trade to GDP ratio  -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
        -0.0057*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0013)          
L1. Governance 
 
  0.023*** 
(0.0028) 
       0.0045 
(0.0057) 
 
          
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy index       
  0.112 
(0.3) 
       -2.027*** 
(0.423) 
-0.302 
(0.383)          
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy 
index_political 
   
5.216*** 
(0.351) 
      
  
         
L1. Central Bank 
Autonomy 
index_economic 
   
-0.697* 
(0.403) 
        
         
  
L1. Crisis cumulative     0.735*** 
(0.138) 
     0.996*** 
(0.175) 
0.272* 
(0.149)          
L1. Credit to GDP ratio      0.0116*** 
(0.00164) 
    0.0083*** 
(0.0026) 
0.00594*** 
(0.0018)          
L1. Non life premium      0.0410 
(0.0949) 
    0.04 
(0.128)           
L1. Stock market  
capitalization 
     -0.0012 
(0.0013) 
    0.00247* 
(0.0013) 
0.0007 
(0.0013)          
L1. Number of listed 
companies 
     -0.0049 
(0.00546) 
    -0.0224** 
(0.00935) 
-0.0117 
(0.0096)          
L1. Concentration 
 
      -0.01*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.0082** 
(0.00385) 
-0.0069* 
(0.0039)          
L1. Cost to income ratio       0.005 
(0.0047) 
   0.00401 
(0.00495) 
 
          
L1. Net interest margin        -0.121*** 
(0.0229) 
  -0.122*** 
(0.0354) 
-0.094*** 
(0.033)          
L1. Non interest income        0.0122** 
(0.00502) 
  -0.006 
(0.006 
 
          
L1. Private credit to 
deposit ratio 
        0.0201*** 
(0.00210) 
 0.0004 
(0.0027) 
 
          
L1. Liquid assets to 
funding ratio 
        0.0142*** 
(0.00342) 
 0.0037 
(0.0044) 
 
          
L1. Non perf. loans ratio          -0.0163 
(0.0164) 
  
           
L1. CAR          -0.0157 
(0.0302) 
  
           
L1.Capital over assets 
 
         
-0.0260 
(0.0336) 
  
           
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; L1 stands for variable’s first lag. 
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Table 3. Robustness analysis 
 Ordered probit pooled 
regression 
Binary choice panel 
regression 
Multinomial logit panel regressions 
E 
 
Explanatory 
variables: 
   Prudential Supervision Business Conduct Supervision 
 
Prudential 
Supervision 
Business Conduct 
Supervision 
Prudential 
Supervision 
Business Conduct 
Supervision 
 
Prob 2 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
Prob 3 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
Prob 4 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
Prob 2 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
Prob 3 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
Prob  4 
/ Prob 1
‡
 
L1. GDP per capita 
at 2000 prices 
0.0194*** 
(0.00622) 
0.0228*** 
(0.00656) 
0.330*** 
(0.0770) 
0.307*** 
(0.0636) 
1.021*** 
(0.302) 
1.207*** 
(0.303) 
1.228*** 
(0.304) 
0.147** 
(0.0588) 
0.221*** 
(0.0495) 
0.210*** 
(0.0473) 
L1. Population 
-0.00092*** 
(0.00027) 
-0.00048 
(0.00035) 
-0.0141 
(0.0265) 
-0.00204 
(0.00605) 
-0.033*** 
(0.008) 
-0.059*** 
(0.01) 
-0.059*** 
(0.021) 
-0.0171*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0023 
(0.0018) 
-0.010*** 
(0.0034) 
L1. Trade to  0.00351*** 
(0.00085) 
-0.00113 
(0.000864) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.0151 
(0.0109) 
0.0265 
(0.0173) 
0.0342** 
(0.0173) 
0.0564*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.0620*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0292*** 
(0.00695) 
-0.00922 
(0.00678) 
L1. Governance 
 
0.0146*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0212*** 
(0.00410) 
0.0110 
(0.0281) 
0.0188 
(0.0402) 
-0.688*** 
(0.176) 
-0.653*** 
(0.176) 
-0.536*** 
(0.179) 
-0.0217 
(0.0244) 
-0.0962*** 
(0.0228) 
-0.0336 
(0.0232) 
L1. CBA Index 
-1.368*** 
(0.260) 
-0.502* 
(0.287) 
1.241 
(3.100) 
-2.336 
(3.938) 
-54.43*** 
(13.63) 
-52.45*** 
(13.65) 
-56.93*** 
(13.72) 
-8.319*** 
(1.850) 
-4.773*** 
(1.808) 
-7.661*** 
(1.736) 
L1. Crisis 
cumulative 
0.586*** 
(0.0980) 
0.411*** 
(0.111) 
1.479 
(1.076) 
1.959** 
(0.958) 
-0.618 
(1.752) 
0.875 
(1.758) 
3.088* 
(1.865) 
-2.248** 
(0.969) 
1.836*** 
(0.597) 
2.976*** 
(0.591) 
L1. Credit to GDP 
ratio 
-0.0059*** 
(0.00148) 
0.00019 
(0.00154) 
-0.0134 
(0.0124) 
0.0295** 
(0.0129) 
0.0975*** 
(0.0338) 
0.0905*** 
(0.0339) 
0.0953*** 
(0.0353) 
0.0810*** 
(0.0145) 
0.0667*** 
(0.0110) 
0.0567*** 
(0.0105) 
L1. Non life 
premium 
-0.219*** 
(0.0771) 
-0.143* 
(0.086) 
-0.115 
(0.623) 
-0.564 
(0.585) 
-4.799** 
(2.298) 
-5.176** 
(2.300) 
-7.824*** 
(2.411) 
-2.333*** 
(0.898) 
0.575 
(0.680) 
0.295 
(0.652) 
L1. Stock market  
capitalization 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0009) 
0.00137 
(0.00091) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.00559) 
-0.0236* 
(0.0137) 
-0.00314 
(0.0129) 
-0.0180 
(0.0130) 
-0.0309** 
(0.0149) 
0.0444*** 
(0.0087) 
0.0441*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0194** 
(0.0077) 
L1. Number of 
listed companies 
0.0220*** 
(0.00463) 
0.000167 
(0.00529) 
-0.109 
(0.117) 
-0.0439 
(0.0769) 
0.0422 
(0.121) 
0.0926 
(0.122) 
-0.235 
(0.209) 
0.127*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.0423 
(0.0361) 
0.121*** 
(0.0329) 
L1. Concentration 
 
0.00735*** 
(0.00246) 
-0.00571** 
(0.00277) 
-0.0357** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0516** 
(0.0206) 
0.268*** 
(0.0661) 
0.240*** 
(0.0664) 
0.193*** 
(0.0680) 
0.0211 
(0.0178) 
-0.0732*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.055*** 
(0.0174) 
L1. Cost to income 
ratio 
-0.00960*** 
(0.00292) 
-0.00260 
(0.00327) 
-0.0306** 
(0.0149) 
-0.00177 
(0.0156) 
0.00882 
(0.0225) 
0.0118 
(0.0217) 
0.0162 
(0.0258) 
0.0319 
(0.0253) 
-0.0226 
(0.0190) 
0.0117 
(0.0163) 
L1. Net interest 
margin 
-0.0922*** 
(0.0223) 
0.0127 
(0.0252) 
-0.122 
(0.129) 
-0.195 
(0.206) 
-0.701 
(0.488) 
-0.610 
(0.494) 
-0.0681 
(0.506) 
0.0880 
(0.129) 
-0.190** 
(0.0919) 
-0.0715 
(0.0941) 
L1. Non interest 
income 
-0.000922 
(0.00338) 
-0.00239 
(0.00392) 
-0.0326** 
(0.0164) 
-0.0307 
(0.0223) 
-0.0668 
(0.0485) 
-0.0301 
(0.0489) 
-0.0554 
(0.0529) 
0.0395 
(0.0250) 
-0.00375 
(0.0208) 
0.0139 
(0.0202) 
L1. Private credit to 
deposit ratio 
0.00938*** 
(0.00146) 
0.00507*** 
(0.00162) 
0.0217*** 
(0.00822) 
0.0124 
(0.00960) 
0.0665*** 
(0.0236) 
0.0881*** 
(0.0239) 
0.0869*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.0665*** 
(0.0156) 
0.000418 
(0.00884) 
0.0206** 
(0.00902) 
L1. Liquid assets to 
funding ratio 
0.00940*** 
(0.00255) 
0.00130 
(0.00297) 
-0.00520 
(0.0138) 
-0.00824 
(0.0162) 
0.0262 
(0.0240) 
-0.00883 
(0.0244) 
0.0418 
(0.0285) 
0.0440** 
(0.0186) 
0.0445** 
(0.0179) 
0.0423** 
(0.0172) 
Note: 
‡
 probability of choosing one supervisory category over the probability of choosing the first ranked supervisory category; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Actual and Model Predicted Values of Prudential Supervision Integration 
 
Source: Authors„ Calculation 
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Figure 2: Actual and Model Predicted Values of Business Conduct Supervision Integration 
 
Source: Authors„ Calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Prudential and business conduct supervisory structures in 98 countries as of end-2010 
Country Prudential Supervision Business Conduct Supervision 
Albania Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Algeria Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Argentina Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Armenia CB CB 
Australia FSA TP 
Austria FSA NBC 
Azerbaijan Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Belarus Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Belgium FSA FSA* 
Bolivia FSA NBC 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Sectoral, BSOCB NBC 
Botswana Sectoral, BSBCB The Office of the Banking Adjudicator 
Brazil Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Bulgaria PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
Canada  PI: BS+IS OCB 
Financial Consumer Protection Agency in charge with the 
supervision of the business conduct of federally regulated 
institutions (banks and insurances) 
Chile PI: IS+SS, BSOCB Sectoral 
China  Sectoral, BSOCB NBC 
Columbia FSA FSA 
Costa Rica Sectoral, BSOCB NBC 
Croatia PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
Cuba Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Cyprus Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Czech Republic CB CB 
Denmark FSA 
Danish Complaint Boards  for Banking Services, Insurance 
and Securities 
Dominican Republic   Sectoral, BSOCB Sectoral 
Ecuador PI: BS+IS OCB Sectoral 
Egypt PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
El Salvador PI: BS+IS OCB NBC 
Estonia FSA NBC 
Finland FSA The Finnish Financial Ombudsman Bureau 
France PI:BS+IS BCB Sectoral 
Georgia CB NBC 
Germany FSA FSA 
Greece Sectoral, BSBCB Banking and Investment Ombudsman 
Guatemala FSA NBC 
Honduras FSA FSA 
Hong Kong Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Hungary FSA FSA 
Iceland FSA FSA 
India Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Indonesia Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Ireland CB CB 
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Israel Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Italy PI: BS+SS BCB Sectoral 
Jamaica  PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
Japan FSA FSA 
Jordan Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Kazakhstan FSA FSA 
Korea, Rep. FSA FSA 
Latvia FSA NBC 
Lebanon PI: BS+SS BCB NBC 
Lithuania Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Luxembourg PI:BS+SS OCB Sectoral 
Macedonia, FYR   Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Malaysia PI:BS+IS, BCB Sectoral 
Malta FSA FSA 
Mauritius PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
Mexico PI: BS+SS, OCB 
National Commission for the Protection and Defense of 
Financial Services Consumers 
Moldova Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Montenegro Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Morocco Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Namibia PI: IS+SS, BSBCB NBC 
Netherlands CB TP 
New Zealand PI: BS+IS BCB NBC 
Nicaragua FSA FSA 
Nigeria Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Norway FSA NBC 
Pakistan S+I, B WCB NBC 
Panama Sectoral, BSOCB Sectoral 
Peru   PI: BS+IS OCB Ombudsman for Consumer Financial Services 
Philippines Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Poland FSA FSA 
Portugal PI: BS+SS BCB Sectoral 
Romania Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Russian Federation Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Saudi Arabia PI: BS+IS BCB NBC 
Serbia PI: BS+IS BCB Sectoral 
Singapore CB CB 
Slovak Republic CB NBC 
Slovenia Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
South Africa PI: IS+SS, BSBCB 
African National Credit Regulator; Ombudsman for banking 
services 
Spain Sectoral, BSBCB Sectoral 
Sri Lanka Sectoral, BSBCB Financial Ombudsman 
Sweden FSA 
Swedish Consumers' Banking & Finance Bureau; The 
Swedish Consumers Insurance Bureau 
Switzerland FSA FSA 
Syrian Arab Republic Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Thailand Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
Trinidad and Tabago PI: BS+IS BCB NBC 
Tunisia Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
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Turkey Sectoral, BSOCB NBC 
Ukraine Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
United Arab Emirates PI: BS+SS BCB Sectoral 
United Kingdom FSA FSA 
United States Sectoral, BSBCB NBC** 
Uruguay CB CB 
Venezuela, RB Sectoral, BSOCB Sectoral 
Vietnam Sectoral, BSBCB NBC 
 Notes: * Since April 2011, Belgium adopted a Twin Peak Supervisory Model; ** The U.S. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau was established in 2010 and was officially opened in July 2011.  
 Sectoral: Each segment of the financial sector is supervised by a different agency; BSBCB: Banking Supervision is 
conducted by the central bank; BSOCB: Banking Supervision is conducted by an agency outside of the central bank; 
 PI: Partial Integration; BS+IS: Joint Banking and Insurance Supervision; BS+SS: Joint Banking and Securities 
Supervision; IS+SS: Joint Insurance and Securities Supervision; BCB: by the central bank; OCB: by an agency outside of the 
central bank. 
 FSA: Financial Supervisory Agency or Financial Services Agency;  
 CB: central bank is the unified supervisor;  
 NBC: no business conduct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 
Table A2: Transition Matrix for Prudential Supervisory Structures 1999-2010 
As of 1999 As of 2010 
  Sectoral Supervision Partial Integration 
FSA 
Integration 
Central Bank 
Integration 
  BS* within CB 
BS* outside 
CB 
in CB** outside CB   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All economies  36 7 10 11 24 8 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS* 
within the CB 
48 
32 (4 countries 
entered the 
sample later 
than 1999) 
1 3 
5-1 (one 
changed 
further)*** 
3 5 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS 
outside of the CB 
7 0 
5; 1 entered 
later 
0 0 2 0 
Partial Integration 
in the CB** 
7 0 0 
4; 2 entered 
later 
0 3-1*** 2-1*** 
Partial Integration 
outside the CB 
13 0 0 0 
3; 1 entered 
later 
7 0 
FSA Integration 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 
CB Integration 3 0 0 1 0 0 2 
High financial 
depth 
 14 2 8 5 15 3 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS 
within the CB 
18 
12; 2 entered 
later 
1 2 2 0 1 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS 
outside of the CB 
2 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Partial Integration 
in the CB 
7 0 0 
4; 1 entered 
later 
0 3-1*** 2-1*** 
Partial Integration 
outside the CB 
7 0 0 0 3 4 0 
FSA Integration 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 
CB Integration 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Lower financial 
depth  
 22 5 2 6 9 5 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS* 
within the CB 
30 
20; 2 entered 
later 
0 1 3-1*** 3 4 
Sectoral 
Supervision, BS* 
outside of the CB 
5 0 
4; 1 entered 
later 
0 0 1 0 
Partial Integration 
in CB 
0 0 0 1 later 0 0 0 
Partial Integration 
outside CB 
6 0 0 0 
3, 1 entered 
later 
3 0 
FSA Integration 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
CB Integration 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Source: Authors calculations; Note: *BS means banking supervision; ** CB means central bank: *** a minus sign 
means that a number of countries changed further to a different regime. 
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Table A3: Transition Matrix for Business Conduct Supervisory Structures 1999-2010 
As of 1999 As of 2010 
 
 
 
No business 
conduct 
Sectoral business 
conduct 
Outside agency 
for financial 
consumer protection 
FSA/Central 
Bank 
Twin Peaks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All economies  47 19 9 19 3 
      0 
No business 
conduct 
71 41; 6 new 14; 2 new 4 12 0 
Sectoral business 
conduct 
6 0 3 0 1 2 
Outside agency 
for financial 
consumer 
protection 
5 0 0 5 0 0 
FSA/Central Bank 6 0 0 0 6 0 
Twin Peaks 1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
High financial 
depth economies 
 18 11 5 11 3 
       
No business 
conduct 
28 15; 3 new 9 0 4 0 
Sectoral business 
conduct 
6 0 2 0 2 2 
Outside agency 
for financial 
consumer protection 
5 0 0 5 0 0 
FSA/Central Bank 5 0 0 0 5 0 
Twin Peaks 1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Lower financial 
depth economies 
 29 8 4 8 0 
No business 
conduct 
43 26; 3 new 6; 2 new 4 7 0 
Sectoral business 
conduct 
0 0 0 0 0  
Outside agency 
for financial 
consumer 
protection 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
FSA/Central Bank 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Twin Peaks 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: authors‟ calculations 
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Table A4. Data sources for all explanatory variables 
Explanatory variable  Sources 
Population World Bank World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators 
Country degree of openness (total trade as a 
percentage of GDP) 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
Quality of governance  Kaufmann et al. (2010).   
Central bank autonomy Arnone et al. (2007) 
Financial sector development indicators World Bank FinStats 2011 
Banking sector indicators World Bank FinStats 2011 
 
 
Table A5: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables 
 
L1. GDP 
per capita
L1. 
Population
L1. Trade 
to GDP 
ratio
L1. 
Governance
L1. 
Central 
Bank 
Autonomy 
index
L1. Crisis 
cumulative
L1. Credit 
to GDP 
ratio
L1. Non 
life 
premium
L1. Stock 
market 
capitalization
L1. Number 
of listed 
companies
L1. 
Concentration
L1. Cost 
to income 
ratio
L1. Net 
interest 
margin
L1. Non 
interest 
income
L1. Private 
credit to 
deposit 
ratio
L1. Liquid 
assets to 
funding 
ratio
L1. GDP per capita 1
L1. Population -0.1019 1
L1. Trade to GDP ratio 0.2312 -0.2152 1
L1. Governance 0.772 -0.157 0.2491 1
L1. Central Bank Autonomy index 0.2732 -0.1305 -0.0281 0.3349 1
L1. Crisis cumulative -0.0815 0.1979 -0.049 -0.1311 -0.0243 1
L1. Credit to GDP ratio 0.6718 0.0163 0.2873 0.6672 0.0711 -0.0118 1
L1. Non life premium 0.6376 -0.1699 0.1274 0.6794 0.2776 0.0742 0.5311 1
L1. Stock market capitalization 0.5285 -0.0156 0.3895 0.415 -0.1117 -0.1073 0.5034 0.2857 1
L1. Number of listed companies 0.2183 0.4559 -0.2101 0.114 -0.0697 0.0449 0.1054 0.1619 0.2035 1
L1. Concentration 0.045 -0.1983 0.1234 0.1869 0.0737 -0.2234 0.0392 -0.0594 0.0824 -0.281 1
L1. Cost to income ratio -0.0506 -0.0452 -0.2459 -0.0275 0.1508 0.0883 -0.1156 0.0195 -0.1665 0.0086 -0.0249 1
L1. Net interest margin -0.4829 -0.0638 -0.1575 -0.5176 -0.076 0.0513 -0.5521 -0.3637 -0.366 -0.0981 -0.081 0.0277 1
L1. Non interest income 0.1926 -0.1021 0.0371 0.1501 0.1443 0.0037 0.0932 0.1956 0.1803 0.0472 -0.0537 0.2065 -0.1636 1
L1. Private credit to deposit ratio 0.1753 -0.1106 -0.0312 0.345 0.2029 -0.107 0.3636 0.3153 0.0128 -0.1172 0.0217 0.0492 -0.0648 0.1004 1
L1. Liquid assets to funding ratio 0.0286 -0.1425 0.0994 -0.048 0.1979 -0.1004 -0.0905 -0.0712 0.0222 -0.1356 0.1237 0.0919 -0.0127 0.2016 -0.2292 1  
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Figure A1: Prudential Supervision, 1999-2010 
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Panel E.  Low financial depth economies     Panel F.  Low financial depth economies 
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Figure A2: Business Conduct, 1999-2010 
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